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IN THE SUPREME; C.OURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FERN GRAY and LEILA GRAY, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
EDWARD R. STEVENS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 852'4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal by Edward R. Stevens from a 
judgment in favor of the Grays quieting title to a home 
owned by the respondents as joint tenants, located in 
Payson, Utah County, Utah. 
The respondents claim the property as a homestead. 
In their claim of a homestead, respondents seek to have 
the full amount of the homestead provided for by U.C.A, 
1955-28-1-1, in the sum of $2750.00 made exempt from 
a judgment lien of the appellant out of the interest of 
Fern Gray in and to the home jointly owned by them. 
The Court below so held and decreed that such home 
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and the whole thereof was freed from appellant's judg-
ment lien. It is from such judgment that this appeal is 
taken. Appellant, however, does not claim that respon-
dents do not have a right to an exemption of $2750.00, 
but he does contend that such exemption does not relieve 
the property from the judgment lien of the appellant 
in and to the interest of Fern Gray in and to the property 
which they had occupied as their home shortly before 
the trial of this case, and which they had vacated pur-
suant to an oral agree to dispose of the same. 
A summary of the evidence received at the trial and 
which is brought here for review by a transcript there-
of is necessary to an understanding of the matters con-
cerning which appellant complains. 
The respondent, Fern Gray, in substance testified 
as follows: 
That he is plaintiff in this case and resides at 
Springlake; that he is the husband of Leila Gray, the 
other plaintiff herein; that he acquired the home here 
involved in March 1941 (Tr. 3). That he made the first 
payment of $600.00 plus interest, making $762.00 in 1941 
and the next pa~~11ent of $600.00 "Tas made in 1942. That 
the first pay1nent was 'vith n1oney he received from the 
sale of cattle 'vhich he o\vned in ''Tyo1ning \Yith Kenneth 
Dix. ( Tr. 4). That the 1noney did not come from any 
profits 1nade out of his partnership with Mr. Stevens. 
That the p,artnership w·ith 1\Ir. Stevens came to an end 
on March 3, 193~; that "'"hen the partnership came to an 
end, he was in debt $4500.00. That the 1noney he paid 
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on the purchase of the home came from a joint bank 
account of himself and wife; that he did not acquire 
title to the property until 1949, but took possession in 
1941. ( Tr. 5) That the property was taken in the joint 
names of the witness and his wife; that the property was 
mortgaged to pay off the debts of plaintiffs (Tr. 6). 
That the wife of the witness had money of her own 
which she received from the sale of the cattle business, 
'vhich money she put into the purchase of the home in 
controversy. (Tr. 7) The money to pay for the home 
came out of the joint checking account; that the wife of 
the witness worked at Gray's Drive Inn (Tr. 8) That 
there is a second mortgage on the home (Tr. 9) That 
the second mortgage was made out in 1953 and is for 
$1100.00; that there was a note given in 1950 by the son 
and the son's wife for $1100.00 signed by the witness 
and the wife of the witness for $1100.00; that the note 
was for money borrowed by the witness and his wife 
(Tr. 10) that the money o'ving on the note is around 
$1600.00. The witness was asked: 
''I call your attention, 11r. Gray, to your com-
plaint which states $1588.00. Which is correct 
$1600.00 or the 1588.00 ~" 
To which he answered : 
"'V ell, there has been quite a little paid since 
that w.as drawn up." 
"Q. But at the time you filed your complaint~ 
A. It was $1588.00. 
Q. That includes principal and interest~ 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Has anything been paid on this at all~ 
A. Not a dime." (Tr. 11) 
Mr. Gray further testified that he was living with 
his wife when he made his declaration of homestead· 
' that he declared the homestead upon his interest to pro-
tect his own rights. ( Tr. 12). That the cash value of 
the property is $12,000.00. (Tr. 13). 
The second mortgage, the deed to the property, the 
note and the homestead declaration were marked and re-
ceived in evidence as Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. 
On cross-examination, Mr. Gray testified that his son 
had been in possession of the note since it was given; 
that when the mortgage was given to secure the note, he 
knew that there was about to be a very substantial judg-
ment rendered against hin1; that he gave the mortgage 
for the purpose of prefering the clailn of his son over 
the judgment. (Tr. 17.) That the witness ,,~as a defend-
ant in an action brought by l\{r. Stevens in which a find-
ing was made "rr,hat in addition to tl1e foregoing money 
charge.able against the defendant, he is chargeable with 
31 head of partnership cattle appropriated by him for his 
own use and benefit; that the date the defendant ap-
propriated such cattle is so1ne,vhat uncertain, but as the 
last partnership cattle 'vere sold on or about 1\farch 4, 
1939, the defendant is chargeable "~ifu said cattle as of 
March 4, 1939, at a price of $84.41, 'Yhich "~as the average 
price that was received fro1n the partnership cattle and 
the defendant is chargeable for sueh cattle tl1e sum of 
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$2,616.71 ;" that the witness knew of such finding and 
that the srune wasn't true. (Tr. 18). That in 1940 the· 
witness bought from J onny B. Jones 100 and some odd 
cattle; that he did not have these cattle 'vhile he was 
in partnership with !:Ir. Stevens. (Tr. 19) In ans,ver 
to the question "when did you buy these cattle that you 
sold and put the money into this home," the witnes1s 
answered "now, listen, I bought cattle in 39, March 2J" 
or 29, Pratt Thomas cattle." that the cattle of Stevens 
and Gray were .all gone March 3, 1939 ; that the witness 
never had the 31 head of cattle that the court found he· 
misappropriated; that the partnership with Stevens ex-
tended from 1936 until the spring of 1939. (Tr. 20). That 
he borro,ved the money from the Utah Livestock Credit 
Corporation with which to buy the cattle from Jones. 
(Tr. 20-21). That the witness is not now willing or able 
to account for where that money 'vent from the sale of 
those 31 head of cattle, because he never had them. (Tr. 
21). That the witness does not remember if he stated 
in his homestead declaration that the Payson property 
was worth $12,500.00; that the Payson property is not 
worth more than $12,000.00; that he is to get $9,000.00 
and a little home in Springlake for the Payson property. 
(Tr. 22) ; that the Springlake property is not worth over 
$3,000.00. (Tr. 24) That the witness does not know 
whether the deal for the disposal of the Payson pro-
perty and the receiving of the Springlake property has 
been called off. (Tr. 24). 
On redirect e~xamination, the witness testified that 
when the Stevens and Gray partnership was dissolved, 
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he was in debt $4500.00; that he did not own any cattle 
when the partnership was dissolved. 
On recross examination, the witness testified that 
he gave a mortgage on the cattle brought from Jones, 
and did not give any other security. (Tr. 25). 
The plaintiff Leila Gray in substance testified as 
follows: r~rhat she is the wife of Fern Gray and resides 
in Springlake and a joint owner with her husband of the 
property in controversy; that she has made the payment 
on the first mortgage on the Payson property. (Tr. 28). 
That she sold some property belonging to her and used 
the money to lease the Loose Ranch and go into the 
cattle business with her husband and always had a joint 
account 'Yith her husband. (Tr. 28). That she signed 
the note and 1nortgage made out to her son and daughter-
in-law and used the $1100.00 to open up the drive-in in 
Payson; that she claims a half interest in the Payson 
property: that the Payson property has a \alue of $12~-
000.00 ( Tr. 29). On cross-exrunination she testified that 
she didn't think she lost the 1uoney she put into the cattle 
business at the Loose ranch. (Tr. 30-31). That the part-
nership proved a loss; that they did not n1ake any money 
during the three years of the partnership; that with the 
money n1ade 'vhile on the Loose R-anrh they bought and 
sold property, .. ,Ye didn't buy any property, we bought 
and sold cattle:~' that she 'ras in business as a partner 
of her husband in buying and selling rattle; that she 
signed notes "'"ith her husband in connection 'vith the 
partnership between her husband .and Stevens, but was 
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not in that deal. That she was opposed to it. ( Tr. 31) · 
That the witness and her husband al\vays had a joint 
account and shared the profits and losses of the business; 
that the other deals where money "\vas made or lost on 
cattle were deals where she and her husband were part-
ners (Tr. 32). 
Richard Gray, a witness called by the plaintiffs, 
testified in substance as follows: 
That he is a son of the plaintiffs, that he loaned 
some money to his father and r.aother; that his wife had 
a bank account in a Salt Lake bank in the sum of $600.00 
of which she drew out $500.00; that they had a bank 
account at Payson of which they drew out $300.00 and 
they had $300.00 in cash ;at hoine, making a total of 
$1100.00 which they loaned to the plaintiffs in 1950 to 
open up the drive-in in Payson. That the plaintiffs gave 
a note at the time of the loan; tha:t the plaintiffs said 
they would give the witness a mortgage on the home to 
secure the note. 
On cross-examination, he stated that he did not ask 
to have the note secured; that the 1nortgage was given 
by his parents on their own initiative. (Tr. 36). That 
his parents came to him and said: "We are not giving 
you a payment on this note because we gave you a 
n1ortgage on the place." That all of the $1100.00 "\vas in 
cash; that he never asked then1 for any payment, but he 
expected them to pay. (Tr. 37). 
Some additional evidence was offered as to the value 
of the real property here involved by witnesses called 
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by the plaintiff and by the defendant. Pearl Bigler 
placed the value of the Payson property at $11,950.00 
(Tr. 39) and the Springlake property at $3500.00. (Tr. 
58). A Mr. Gale Barron used a somewhat unique theory 
of values in that he said if a loan of $9,000.00 could be 
secured on the Payson property it would be worth $12.-
000.00; that he has seen the Springlake property from 
the street and in his opinion, it was worth $3500.00. (Tr . 
.. 13). He stated that the usual manner of fixing market 
value is all wrong. (Tr. 46) :Th1r. Burdick, a witness called 
by defendant, placed the market value of the Payson 
property at $12,200.00 (Tr. 49) and the Springlake pro-
perty at $3,900.00. J\Ir. Elmer, a witness called by the de-
fendant, placed the market value of the Payson property 
at $12,000.00 (Tr. 53) and the Springlake property at 
$3871.00 and by a different method at $3939.00. (Tr. 54). 
!Ir. Gray testified that the amount owing on the first 
mortgage on March 1st was $5830.96 and there was in-
terest since that date 'vhich he had not con1puted. (Tr. 
46-47). The files in the case "~here the judgment was 
rendered which plaintiffs in their action seek to have 
ihe court hold does not constitute a lien on the Payson 
property \vas received in evidence. (Tr. 57). This, of 
course, is a suit in equity and l1ence this court will review 
both the la\v and the facts. 
The appellant relies upon the following Points for 
a reversal of the judgment appealed from: 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
T'HE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
PLAIN·TIFF FERN GRAY HAS A HOlVIESTEAD EXEMP-
TION IN rrHE UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF INTEREST OF 
FERN GR.AY IN THE PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED AND 
THAT SU1CH HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION IS $2750.00. (R. 12) 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL CO·URT ERRED IN FINDING THA:T THE 
INTEREST OF LEILA GRAY IN THE PRO·PER'TY HERE 
INVOLVED IS A ONE-HALF THEREOF, IN ADDITION TO 
HER RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CLAIMED RIGHT 
OF HER. HUSBAND FOR A HO·MESTEAD. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THA'T 
RI'CHARD AND DEON GRAY HAVE A VALID AND BIND-
ING MORTGAGE ON THE PREMISES HERE INVOLVED IN 
THE SUM OF $1588.02 OR IN ANY OTHER SUM. (R. 12) 
POIN'T IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND ON 
ALL OF THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE AND PARTICULARLY 
IN FAILING TO FIND 'THAT THE PLAIN'TIFF FERN GRAY 
MISAPPROPRIATED 31 HEAD OF ~CATTLE BELONGING 
TO THE PARTNERSHIP OF GRAY AND STEVENS. (R. 12) 
P·OINT· V. 
THE TRIAL GOURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW THAT THE JUDGMENT OF EDWARD R. STEVENS 
IS NOT A LIEN ON T'HE INTEREST OF FERN GRAY IN 
THE PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED AND IN ENTERING 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS FERN GRAY AND 
LEILA GRAY QUIETING IN THEM THE TITLE TO THE 
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PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED FREE FROM THE JUDG-
MENT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT EDWARD R. 
STEVENS IN CASE NO. 14, 240 (R. 14-15) 
ARGUMENT 
The statutory laws of Utah that have a bearing on 
the question presented for review in this appeal are: 
U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-1, which provides that a homestead 
shall consist of lands, appurtenances and improvements 
not exceeding in value the sum of $2000.00 for the head 
of the family and the further sum of $750.00 for the 
spouse and $300.00 for each other n1ember of the family. 
U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-6 provides; 
"If the homestead claimant is married, the 
homestead may be selected from the separate pro-
perty of the husband, or "ith the consent of the 
wife from her separate property.'~ 
U. S. A. 1953, 48-1-22, subdivision (c) provides: 
~'A partner's right in specific partnership 
property is not subject to attachment or execu-
tion, except on a claim against the partnership. 
Where partnership property is attached for a 
partnership debt, the partners, or any of them, or 
the representatiYe of a deceased partner can not 
clailn any right under the ho1nestead or exenlp-
tion la\vs." 
It follows fron1 the proYisions of l 1.C.A. 1953, 28-1-1 
ana U.C .... l\.., 1~)53, 48-1-22 that a husband or a wife, or 
both husband and "~ife 'Yithout me1ubers of the family 
are lilnited to a ho1ne~tead net Yalue of $2750.00. That 
is to ~ay the value of the property after all valid liens 
are deducted fron1 the actual value. 
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POINT I. 
T'HE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THA·T THE 
PLAINTIFF FERN GRAY HAS A HOMESTEAD EXEMP-
·TION IN THE UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF INTEREST OF 
FERN GRAY IN THE PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED AND 
THAT SUCH HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION IS $2750.00. (R. 12) 
It will be seen from the testimony of plaintiff Fern 
Gray that: 
1. A finding was made in the case of Stevens v. 
Gray wherein the judgment was rendered which Gray 
seeks to have declared not a lien on the property here 
involved. The court found that Gray misappropriated 
to his own use 31 head of partnership cattle of Stevens 
and Gray of the value of $2616.71. (Tr. 18) and File No. 
1424 (Tr. 57). 
2. That he, Fern Gray, executed a mortgage in 
favor of his son, Richard Gray, for the purpose of plac-
ing a lien on the Payson property which would be prior 
in t~me to a judgment which he, Fern Gray, knew was 
a bout to be entered in favor of the defendant herein, 
Edward R. Stevens. (Tr. 17). 
3. That Fern Gray received .a total of $3482.02 in 
value of the 31 head of cattle and money out of the 
Stevens-Gray partne-rship more than he put into the 
partnership, while Stevens paid out $9007.16 more than 
he received from the partnership. See finding No. 20 
in Civil Case No. 14,240 which was received in evidence. 
(Tr. 57). 
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4. That all of the Gray-Stevens cattle were disposed 
of on or about March 3,1939, (Tr. 5). 
5. That on March 28 or 29, 1939 he, Fern Gray, 
bought cattle from Pratt Thomas. (Tr. 20). 
6. That in 1940 he bought about 100 head of cattle 
from J onny B. Jones with money he borrowed from the 
Utah Livestock Credit Corporation. That the first pay-
ment of $762.00 made on the home was with money he 
received from the sale of cattle which he had in Wyom-
ing with Kenneth Dix. (Tr. 4). 
7. That the $600.00 plus interest that was used to 
make the first payment on the purchase price of the 
Payson property came from a joint account of Mr. Gray 
and his wife. (Tr. 5). 
8. That the plaintiffs ,,~ere engaged in several ven-
tures and kept a joint bank account of their receipts and 
expenses. ( Tr. 28-31, 32). 
There is other testnnony given by :Jir. Gray which 
is at variance "~ith testin1ony above referred to. Thus, 
he testified that he did not get any n1oney from the sale 
of the partnership cattle owned by him and ~Ir. Stevens. 
He testified that he '"as in debt $4500.00 "~hen the part-
nership between hin1 and Stevens can1e to an end on 
Marrh 3, 1939, ( Tr. 5) and yet "~ithin less than a month 
after the partnership ca111e to an end, he bought cattle 
from Pratt Thonla$. He does not tell us anything about 
where he ree(~ived the n1oney '"ith 'rhich to buy the 
Thomas cattle. He testified that the cattle he sold and 
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used some of the money received from the sale w.as 
purchased with money borrowed from the Utah Live-
stock Credit Corporation. (Tr. 21). It is to say the least 
extremely improbable that the Utah Livestock Credit 
Corporation, or any other money lender, will loan suffi-
cient money to buy 100 head of cattle with no security 
except a mortgage on the cattle purchased. Mr. Gray fails 
to inform us of any money he received other than the 
rnoney he must have received from the proceeds of the 
sale of the Gray-Stevens cattle and particularly the 31 
head that he misappropriated. He received $3482.02 more 
out of the partnership with Stevens than he put in. The 
court so found. 
The law applicable to such a state of facts has re-
ceived judicial application on numerous occasions. The 
authorities are all to the effect that : 
"A judgement rendered by a court having 
jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter is 
conclusive and undisputable evidence as to all 
rights, questions or facts put in issue in the suit 
and actually adjudicated thereon where the same 
comes again into controversy between the same 
parties or their privies, even though according to 
the decision on the questions, the subsequent pro-
ceedings are on a different cause of action, since 
the law abhors a multiplicity of suits." 
50 C.J.S. page 168, Sec. 711. 
To the same effect is the law stated in 50 C.J.S. page 
141, Sec. 686. Among the numerous cases cited from 
state and federal courts in support of the text are these 
from Utah: 
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Matthews v. Matthews, 102 Ut. 428; 132 P.ac. (2d) 111; 
State v. Erw,in, 101 Ut. 365, 120 Pac. (2d) 285; Boland 
v. Erwin, 79 Ut. 331; 10 p,ac. (2d) 930. Other Utah cases 
are cited in the foregoing Utah cases. 
So also is the law settled in this and other jurisdic-
tions that the burden is on the one who claims a right 
to a homeste.ad to establish the same. Zuniga v. Evans, 
87, U t. 198, 48 Pac. ( 2d) 513; 101 A.L.R. 532; Gordon 
v. Harper, 106 Ut. 560, 151 Pac. (2d) 99, 102; 154 A.L.R. 
906. 
So also do the authorities teach that if money is 
misappropriated by a person and applied on the pur-
chase of a homestead, the person or one in privity with 
such person may not successfully claim a right to a home-
stead exemption as against the person whose money 
has been misappropriated and applied on the payment 
of the claimed homestead. Following are among the 
authorities so holding: Gustan J. Warso, Jr. Admr. v. 
Ashkosh Savings & Trust Co. 47 A.L.R. 366: 190 \~"'{is. 
87; 208 N.vV. 886. 
We quote the following fro1n the syllabi of the case 
above cited in 47 A.L.R. 366: 
"It was never contemplated nor intended that 
a hon1estead shall he created and n1aintained "ith 
stolen or en1bezzled property, or by wrongful.ap-
propriation of property rightly belonging to an-
other. If this were so, the statute exempting a 
homestead instead of promoting the public wel-
fare would operate as an imn1oral and baneful 
influence undern1ining and destroying the funda-
mental principles of government." 
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In 3 Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Ed. pp. 
3297-2401 it is said: 
"A constructive trust arises whenever ;an-
other's property has been wrongfully appropri-
ated and converted into a different form. Equity 
impresses a constructive trust upon the new form 
or species of property (where property is wrong-
fully taken) not only while it is in the hands of 
the original wrongdoer, but as long as it can be 
followed and identified in whosoever's hands it 
may come, except into those of a bona fide pur-
chaser for value and without notice, and the court 
will enforce the constructive trust for the bene-
fit of the beneficial owner or original cestui que 
trust who has thus been defrauded." 
See also 47 A.L.R. 369, et seq. American Railway Ex-
press Con~pany v. Dolphus J. Hauli, et al, 48 A.L.R. 
1266 et seq. Vl e refr.ain from citing other authorities 
because the law above cited see1ns to be of universal ap-
plication as we have found none to the contrary. 
There is a rule of law of general application which 
is thus stated in 20 Am. Jur. 145-146: 
"The ommission by a party to produce im-
portant testimony relating to a fact of which he 
has knowledge and which is peculiarly within his 
own control raises the presumption that the testi-
mony, if produced, would be unfavorable in his 
case. In such case the burden of coming forward 
with proof is upon the party who wishes to sup-
port his case by a particular fact which lies more 
· peculiarly within his own knowledge or of which 
he is supposed to be cogniz.ant." 
Numerous cases are cited in foot notes to the text which 
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support the general rule as well as exceptions thereto. 
Independent of the law just quoted, the burden of proof 
was on the plaintiffs to establish the claimed homestead. 
It is so held in the Utah cases heretofore cited. The de-
fendant obviously could not know what the plaintiff, 
Fern Gray, ultimately did with the profit of $3482.02 
which he made out of the partnership with Stevens, and 
in which Stevens took a loss of $9007.16. Plaintiff Fern 
Gray contented himself with saying he did not get the 
31 head of cattle. However, according to his own testi-
mony he purchased some cattle from Pratt Thomas with-
in a month after the Stevens-Gray partnership cattle 
were all sold. He does not tell where he received the 
money to buy the Bame, or when he sold the same, or what 
he did with the money. According to the testimony of Mr. 
Gray he bought some 100 odd cattle from J onny B. Jones 
(Tr. 19). The only explanation he gave of where the 
money came from to buy those cattle is the extremely 
improbable statement that he borrowed the same from 
the Utah Livestock Credit Corporation and gave a mort-
gage to secure the same. ( Tr. 21). These v.arious trans-
actions, according to 11r. Gray, 'Yere all carried on by 
checks drawn on a joint account of the plaintiffs herein. 
(Tr. 7 -8). 
Under the facts established in this case the law thus 
announced in 20 A1n. Jur. 145-6, Sec. 140 is especially 
applicable. 
"The broad rule prevails that the ormss1on 
of a party to produce important testimony relat-
ing to a fact of which he has knowledge and which 
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is peculiarly within his own control raises the 
presumption that the testimony if produced, would 
be unfavorable to his cause. In such case the 
burden of coming forward with proof is upon the 
part who wishes to support his case by .a par-
ticular fact which lies more peculiarly within his 
knowledge, or of which he is supposed to be cog-
nizant." 
Among cases where· this rule of law has been ap-
plied are: City of Fort Smith vs. Dodson, 11 S.W. 687; 
Fowler Parking Co. v. Erzenperger, 94 Pac. 995,; First 
Nat'l Bank of Davenport v. Baker et .al, 10 N.W. 633; 
Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Swenk, 222 Ala. 496; 132 So. 
728. In 130 A.L.R., page 480, and in 23 A.L.R. (2d) at 
page 1271 will be found an annotation of the law now 
being discussed. Numerous cases will be found collected 
in 130 A. L. R. page 480, and 23 A. L. R. ( 2d) 1271 
only .a few of which are heretofore cited. As applied to 
this case obviously the defendant, Mr. Stevens could not 
ascertain with certainty just vvhat Mr. Gray did with 
the profit in the sum of $3482.02 'vhich he unlawfully 
appropriated to his own use out of the Stevens-Gray 
partnership. It is made to appear that the money went 
into the joint account of the plaintiffs herein, and that 
the money applied on the purchase of the Payson pro-
perty, which is claimed as a homestead, came out of that 
fund. In such case the presumption prevails that the 
money that went into the purchase of the claimed exempt 
property came from the money misappropriated as other-
wise Mr. Gray would have testified as to what he· did 
with that money. 
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POINT II. 
·THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
INTEREST OF LEILA GRAY IN THE PROPERTY HERE 
INVOLVED IS A ONE-HALF THEREOF, IN ADDITION TO 
HER RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CLAIMED RIGHT 
OF HER HUSBAND FOR A HOMESTEAD. 
What has been said under Point One is applicable 
as to the claim of the plaintiff, Leila Gray, to the claim 
of her husband Fern Gray. If the clain1 of Fern Gray 
fails because of the facts and the law discussed under 
Point One, any claim that Leila Gray may seek to estab-
lish by reason of a claim founded on her husband's claim 
1nust of necessity fail. She is in privity with her hus-
band in so far as she seeks to avail herself of a right 
to benefit by reason of the claim of a homestead right 
of her husband. The word privity has been variously de-
fined as will be seen from the text and cases cited in 72 
C.J.S. pp. 954 to 962. Among the definitions on.e of 
the most generally .accepted is that privies are those per-
sons who have mutual or successive relationship to the 
same rights of property or subject matter as is possessed 
by the parties to the litigation as then1selves. ~Ioreover 
'vhile· Mrs. Gray testifies that she " ... as opposed to 1fr. 
Gray going into pa1~nership ·with ~Ir. Stevens (Tr. 31) 
she did testify that she signed notes vvith him in connec-
tion with that p.artnership; that she 'vas engaged in busi-
ness with her husband in other prop·erties in buying and 
~elling cattle. (Tr. 31-32). So far as appears 1\frs. Gray 
was not opposed to the n1oney 'Yhich 1\fr. Gray received 
for the 31 head of cattle that he 1nisappropriated going 
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into their joint account .and being used for conducting 
their business including the purchase of the home, which 
is being claimed as exempt by both Mrs. and Mr. Gray. 
It will be noted that the court found that Mrs. Gray 
owned a fee simple title to a one-half interest in the 
property here involved. ..A.s. we understand the law, t\vo 
persons who are joint owners of a track of land are not 
thereby owners in fee simple of an undivided one-half 
interest therein. It will be noted that under the provi-
sions of U.C.A. 1953, 48-1-22, subdivision (c) partnership 
property is liable for attachment for a partnership debt. 
While the judgment here involved runs only against Mr. 
Gray, if Mrs. Gray was .a silent partner, as she appears 
to have been in the Stevens-Gray p.artnership, she is 
liable for the money which Mr. Gray wrongfully appro-
priated from that partnership. We shall have more to 
say about the joint ownership of the Payson property 
later in this brief. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
RICHARD AND DEON GRAY HAVE A VALID AND BIND-
ING MORTGAGE ON THE PREMISES HERE INVOLVED IN 
THE SUM OF $1588.02 OR IN ANY OTHER SUM. (R. 12) 
There are, to put it mildly, a number of circum-
Btances surrounding the giving of the second mortgage 
here involved which indicate that the sole purpose in 
giving the same was an attempt to fortify the claim of 
a homestead exemption. On direct examination, Mr. Gray 
first testified th.at there was around $1600.00 owing on 
the mortgage to his son and daughter-in-law. When at-
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tention was called to the allegation of his complaint that 
$1588.00 was due, he testified that there had been quite 
a little paid since that was dra\vn up and when aided 
further by questions by his counsel, he said not a dime 
had been paid. (Tr. 11). On cross-examination, he testi-
fied that when he gave the mortgage he knew that a 
very substantial judgment was about to be rendered 
against him. (Tr. 17). By his homestead declaration he 
placed the value of the Payson property at 12,500.00 but 
he testified at the trial that it was not worth over $12,-
000.00. The note of $11,000.00 and the claimed interest 
thereon makes up an amount necessary to support the 
claim for a complete exemption on the assumption that 
the full exemption can be taken out of ~ir. Gray's interest 
in the property. 
Richard Gray testified that the money he loaned to 
his parents w;as all cash, $500.00 his wife had in Zion's 
Savings Bank at Salt Lake, $300.00 in a bank at Payson 
and $300.00 in cash they had in the house; that he did 
not ask for the Inortgage. (Tr. 36-37) Not a centila of 
documentary evidence was offered in support of the 
claim as to where the money came from that is claimed 
to have been loaned. For some reason, not accounted 
for, the daughter-in-law was not called to testify. An 
examination of the note will reve~al that it has none of 
the characteristics that one would expect in an instru-
ment that was clai1ned to be more than five years old 
at the time of a trial. If a :family scheme such as is 
revealed by the evidence in this case is to receive judicial 
approval, then indeed the language above quoted in the 
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statute providing for a homestead exemption instead of 
providing for the general welfare would operate as an 
immor.al and baneful influence undermining and destroy-
ing the fundamental principles of government. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND ON 
ALL OF THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE AND PARTICULARLY 
IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE PLAIN'TIFF FERN GRAY 
MISAPPROPRIATED 31 HEAD OF ·CATTLE BELONGING 
TO THE PARTNERSHIP OF GRAY AND STEVENS. (R. 12) 
It will be seen that the Court below found that the 
allegations and averments of plaintiffs' complaint are 
true - that all of the denials .and allegations and aver-
ments of said answer and amended answer adverse to 
and inconsistent with plaintiffs' complaint are untrue. 
Such a so-called finding has been repeatedly condemned 
by this court. Baker v. f!atch. 76 Ut. 1, 257 Pac. 673. 
Numerous other Utah cases where the same doctrine is 
announced will be found collected in foot notes 2 and 3 
of 257 Pac. at page 67 4. The court makes no findings 
that in case No. 14,240 civil the court made the findings 
alleged in the .additional answer of the defendant. (R. 9). 
While the plaintiff, Fern Gray, denied the facts there 
found as we have heretofore pointed out, he is bound 
by such findings. The defendant is entitled to a finding 
in conformity with his allegations contained in his addi-
tional answer. (R. 9). Apparently the court found to 
the contrary. 
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POINT· V. 
T'HE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW THAT THE JUDGMENT OF EDWARD R. STEVENS 
IS NOT A LIEN ON THE INTEREST OF FERN GRAY IN 
THE PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED AND IN ENTERING 
JUDGMEN·T IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS FERN GRAY AND 
LEILA GRAY QUIETING IN THEM THE TITLE TO THE 
PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED FREE FROM THE JUDG-
MENT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT EDWARD R. 
STEVENS IN ·CASE NO. 14, 240 (R. 14-15) 
It is provided in U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-8 that: 
"It shall be the privilege of either the hus-
band or the wife to claim and select a homestead 
to the full extent prescribed in this title on the 
failure of the other, being the judgment debtor, 
to make such claim or s-election." 
U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-6 provides that: 
"If the homestead claimant is married, the 
homeste~d may be selected from the separate pro-
perty of the husband otlwith the consent of the 
wife from her separate property." 
In this case the property h~ere involved was doubt-
less a homestead of the plaintiffs "ithout the formal act 
of making the declaration indicated by Exhibit P-4. A 
homestead, as the authorities teach, is for the protection 
of the husband and \\rife and other men1bers of the fanrily. 
U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-5 provides that the phase "head of 
a family as used in this title includes "ithin its meaning: 
1. The husband and wife, 'vhen the clain1ant is a 
married person, but in no case are both husband and 
wife entitled e:ach to a homeBtead." 
, 
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It was urged in the Court below that the case of 
Williams v. Peterson, 86 Utah 526, 46 Pac. (2d) 674 
gives support to the claim that plaintiff Fern Gray may 
make a selection of a homestead to the full amount of 
$2750.00 because he is ,a joint owner of the property 
here involved. There are various reasons why that case 
is not controlling in this case. In that case the wife had 
taken a mortgage on her husband's intere,st in a tract 
of land held as tenants in common by the husband and 
wife. The husband had taken $5000.00 from a joint ac-
count and made a poor investment of the same. The· wife 
objected to the husband making the investment; the hus-
band gave a note to the wife for $4500.00, which he re-
newed for $5220.00 and gave .a mortgage on prope-rty 
owned by the husband and wife as tenants in common 
which, ho,vever, was not occupied by them as their home. 
In this case the money which Mr. Gray unlawfully ap-
propriated went into the joint account of the plaintiffs 
and thus enriched both of the plaintiffs. Neither of the 
plaintiffs accounted for the money misappropriated and 
that being so, the presumption is that it went into the 
purchase of the home. The language above quoted, 
namely "in no case are both husband and wife entitled 
each to a homestead" cannot, without ignoring its plain 
meaning, be construed to me:an that the plaintiffs are 
each entitled to $2750.00. The interest that Mrs. Gray 
owned in the Payson property was as much a part of 
the Gray homestead as was the interest of Mr. Gray. 
To hold otherwise would be to engage in a process of 
metaphysical reasoning which has no place in law. It 
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will further be noted that the statutes U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-6 
and 28-1-8 permits the selection to be made out of the 
separate property of the husband or the wife. In this caBe 
the interest which ~1r. Gray had in the Payson property 
was in no sense his separate property. Quite the con-
trary, property held in joint tenancy by a husband and 
'vife may not be said to be held in severalty by the hus-
band and wife. We do not contend that a husband and 
wife are not entitled to a homestead in the amount fixed 
by law in .a home jointly owned. If the decision app·ealed 
from is permitted to stand, it will mean that the Grays 
are entitle~d to twice the amount of homestead exemption 
that is permitted by the statute. It has become a common 
practice for a husband and wife to take title to a home 
as joint tenants. It may be inquired is there any reason 
why in such case if a judg1nent is rendered against one 
of the spous:es the full amount of exemption should be 
allowed such spouse and in addition thereto the interest 
of the other spouse should remain intact, while on the 
other hand, if a judgment is rendered against a spouse 
holding the entire title, the limit of the homestead exemp-
tion is that fixed by law. 
It is said by this court in the case of Kemball v. 
Lewis, 17 Ut. 381, 53 Pac. 1037, that the l1omeste:ad act 
"was intended to secure and protect the home 
against creditors and as a 1neans of support to 
every family in the state." 
That being the purpose of the homestead law, there is 
no reason why ;a husband and wife who hold the title to 
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a home as joint tenants are entitled to a greater pro-
tection than are. those who may have the title in the name 
of the spouse against whon1 a judgment is rendered. To 
hold otherwise would constitute class legislation and of-
fend against the provisions of Article VI, See. 26, sub-
division 18, Constitution of Utah, wherein it is provided 
that: 
"In all cases where a general law can he ap-
plicable~, no special law shall be enacted." 
If !fr. Gray may succe!ssfully claim a homestead for 
the full amount out of his share in the Payson property 
free from a judgment against him, by the same token 
Mrs. Gray may succeed in rnaking a claim of a home-
stead for the full amount of her :i,nterest in the Payson 
property. Mr. Gray cannot deprive Mrs. Gray of a right 
to 1nake a homestead claim by himself making such a 
claim. Attention is again called to the provisions of 
U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-5 which provides that either the hus-
band or the wife may make the selection, but in no case 
are both husband and wife entitled to a homestead. 
The right to a homestead is the creature of statu-
tory law. The common law does not grant a right to a 
homestead. We have examined a number of statutes and 
decisions of the various states .and have been unable to 
find two states that have identical laws. Thus in some 
states property held by two or more persons as joint 
tenants is not subject to a homestead exemption. In 
others it may be, especially if the joint tenants are hus-
band and wife. See 40 C.J.S. Sec.; 88, page 140. In some 
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~tates where a homestead is held jointly by a husband 
and wife, each must contribute one-half to the homestead. 
The case of Johnson v. Nuntz, 364 Ill. 482, 4 N.E. (2d) 
826 is such a case. A similar doctrine seems to be the 
law in Oklahoma. Mitchell v. Quinton, 116 Pac. (2d) 995. 
We, however, do not wish to undertake to discuss the 
various laws dealing with homesteads. To do that would 
extend this brief beyond reasonable limits, but would 
probably be of little, if any, aid in the proper construc-
tion of the statutes of Utah. 
Bec.ause of the reasons herein stated, it is submitted 
that the judgment appealed from should be reversed and 
this court direct the court below to enter judgment deny-
ing the plaintiff )j-,ern Gray any homestead right in and 
to the property here involved. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELIAS HANSEN 
Attorney for appellant 
721 Cont'l Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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